Did Laissez-Faire Cause the Great Depression?

The enemies of the free market often quote Andrew Mellon, the treasury secretary under Hoover as evidence that President Hoover's hands off approach is what prolonged the great depression.

"Liquidate labor, liquidate stocks, liquidate the farmers, liquidate real estate. . . . [That] will purge the rottenness out of the system. High costs of living and high living will come down. People will work harder, live a more moral life. Values will be adjusted, and enterprising people will pick up the wrecks from less competent people"

However, using the above quote as evidence of laissez-faire is distortion of the truth. In fact, President Hoover was too much of an activist to sit on his hands and let the markets work. Until the crash of 1929, the general policy of the federal government to an economic crisis was a relatively hands-off approach. However, Hoover wanted to bail out the failing enterprises. Here is what he said during one of his campaign speeches in 1932 on this matter.

"we might have done nothing. That would have been utter ruin. Instead we met the situation with proposals to private business and to Congress of the most gigantic program of economic defense and counterattack ever evolved in the history of the Republic. We put it into action. . . . No government in Washington has hitherto considered that it held so broad a responsibility for leadership in such times. . . . For the first time in the history of depression, dividends, profits, and the cost of living, have been reduced before wages have suffered. . . . They were maintained until the cost of living had decreased and the profits had practically vanished. They are now the highest real wages in the world. Creating new jobs and giving to the whole system a new breath of life; nothing has ever been devised in our history which has done more for . . . “the common run of men and women.” Some of the reactionary economists urged that we should allow the liquidation to take its course until we had found bottom. . . . We determined that we would not follow the advice of the bitter end liquidationists and see the whole body of debtors of the United States brought to bankruptcy and the savings of our people brought to destruction."

Again from Hoover's memoirs...

"We developed cooperation between the federal, state, and municipal governments to increase public works. We persuaded employers to “divide” time among their employees so that as many as possible would have some incomes. We organized the industries to undertake renovation, repair, and, where possible, expand construction."

"I determined that it was my duty, even without precedent, to call upon the business of the country for coordinated and constructive action to resist the forces of disintegration. The business community, the bankers, labor, and the government have cooperated in wider spread measures of mitigation than have ever been attempted before. Our bankers and the reserve system have carried the country through the credit . . . storm without impairment. Our leading business concerns have sustained wages, have distributed employment, have expedited heavy construction. The Government has expanded public works, assisted in credit to agriculture, and has restricted immigration. These measures have maintained a higher degree of consumption than would otherwise have been the case. They have thus prevented a large measure of unemployment. . . . Our present experience in relief should form the basis of even more amplified plans in the future."

Rhetoric is one thing and reality is another. Reality was a Keynesian's delight. Huge deficit spending by the Hoover administration. The following is from America's Great Depression by Murray Rothbard(PDF format).

Federal expenditures rose from $4.2 billion in 1930 to $5.5 billion in 1931—excluding government enterprises, it rose from $3.1 billion to $4.4 billion, an enormous 42 percent increase. In short, in the midst of a great depression when people needed desperately to be relieved of governmental burdens, the dead weight of government rose from 16.4 percent to 21.5 percent of the gross private product (from 18.2 percent to 24.3 percent of the net private product). From a modest surplus in 1930, the Federal government thus ran up a huge $2.2 billion deficit in 1931.And so President Hoover, often considered to be a staunch exponent of laissez-faire, had amassed by far the largest peacetime deficit yet known to American history. In one year, the fiscal burden of the Federal government had increased from 5.1 percent to 7.8 percent, or from 5.7 percent to 8.8 percent of the net private product.

Hoover's (not FDR) Glass-Steagal

One thing Hoover was not reticent about: launching a huge inflationist program. First, the administration cleared the path for the program by passing the Glass–Steagall Act in February, which (a) greatly broadened the assets eligible for rediscounts with the Fed, and (b) permitted the Federal Reserve to use government bonds as collateral for its notes, in addition to commercial paper.

Does the following sound familiar?

During 1932, President Hoover greatly stepped up his one man war on the stock market, particularly on shortsellers, whom he naïvely and absurdly persisted in blaming for the fall in stock prices. Hoover forgot that bulls and bears always exist, and that for every bear bet there must be an offsetting bull, and also forgot that speculation smooths fluctuations and facilitates movement toward equilibrium. On February 16, Hoover called in the leaders of the New York Stock Exchange and threatened governmental coercion unless it took firm action against the “bears,” the shortsellers. The Exchange tried to comply, but not aggressively enough for Hoover, who declared himself unsatisfied.

Having warned the Exchange of a Congressional investigation, Hoover induced the Senate to investigate the Stock Exchange, even though he admitted that the Federal Government had no constitutional jurisdiction over a purely New York institution. The President used continual pressure to launch the investigation of what he termed “sinister” “systematic bear raids,” “vicious pools . . . pounding down” security prices, “deliberately making a profit from the losses of other people.” Beside such demagogic rhetoric, constitutional limitations seemed pale indeed. Secretary of Commerce Lamont protested against the investigation, as did many New York bankers, but Hoover was not to be dissuaded. In answering the New York bankers, Hoover used some unknown crystal ball to assert that present prices of securities did not represent “true values.”

Federal Home Loan Bank, a Hoover creation

President Hoover, we remember, had wanted to establish a grandiose mortgage discount bank system to include all financial institutions, but the rejection of the scheme by insurance companies forced him to limit compulsory coverage to the building-andloan associations. The Federal Home Loan Bank Act was passed in July, 1932, establishing 12 district banks ruled by a Federal Home Loan Bank Board in a manner similar to the Federal Reserve System.
$125 million capital was subscribed by the Treasury, and this was subsequently shifted to the RFC.

It didn't end there...

Measures such as Federal and state and local public works, worksharing, maintaining wage rates (“a large majority have maintained wages at high levels” as before), curtailment of immigration, and the National Credit Corporation, Hoover declared, have served these purposes and fostered recovery. Now, Hoover urged more drastic action, and he presented the following program:
(1) Establish a Reconstruction Finance Corporation, which would use Treasury funds to lend to banks, industries, agricultural credit agencies, and local governments;
(2) Broaden the eligibility requirement for discounting at the Fed;
(3) Create a Home Loan Bank discount system to revive construction and employment measures which had beenwarmly endorsed by a National Housing Conference recently convened by Hoover for that purpose;
(4) Expand government aid to Federal Land Banks;
(5) Set up a Public Works Administration to coordinate and expand Federal public works;
(6) Legalize Hoover’s order restricting immigration;
(7) Do something to weaken “destructive competition” (i.e., competition) in natural resource use;
(8) Grant direct loans of $300 million to States for relief;
(9) Reform the bankruptcy laws (i.e., weaken protection for the creditor). Hoover also displayed anxiety to “protect railroads from unregulated competition,” and to bolster the bankrupt railroad lines. In addition, he called for sharing-the-work programs to save several millions from unemployment.

Did I mention Smoot-Hawley or Hoover Dam?

It should be obvious that the Keynesian "improvements" at best did nothing to help the situation during the depression, and at worst worsened the depression. 10 years after the crash of 1929, the unemployment still hovered around 20%.

Now, let's look at the Japanese experience. We all have heard the expression Japan's lost decade - 1990s. Is that description really accurate? Japanese stock market recently hit the 1982 levels just last week. So it is more like 3 lost decades. Japanese followed the advise of the Keynesian and Monetarist economists. They started running huge deficits and public works programs ( Keynesian ) and dropped interests rate to effectively zero and printed money like it was going out of style ( monetarist ) and yet 20 years after the crash in Japan, the economy still sputters. The public works program has put the entire country under a think layer of concrete ( Isn't it amazing that the evironmentally friendly Keynesians would put whole nation under layer of concrete, to stimulate consumption? ), and yet it had no stimulatory effect.