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There needs to be a in-depth comparison between the market and policy response of the 1921 depression and the Great Depression and what it means for the current crisis. Here it is:
Someone should really point to the 1921 depression for President Obama to study rather than the Great Depression of 1929-1933.
According to J.R. Vernon in "The 1920-21 Deflation: The Role of Aggregate Supply," the one-year deflation of this time is the largest ever recorded: “This is true whether the Department of Commerce [ 1986 ] estimates or the recently provided Balke and Gordon [ 1989 ] or Romer [ 1989 ] estimates are used. These estimates produce one-year deflation figures of 18 percent, 13.0 percent, and 14.8 percent, respectively. The closest competitor is the 11.5 percent deflation recorded for 1931-32, the third year of the Great Depression.” Furthermore, the "ratio of the percentage decline in the GNP deflator for 1920-21 to the percentage decline in real GNP is 2.6 using the Department of Commerce figures, 3.7 using the Balke and Gordon data, and 6.3 using the Romer data." But "the ratios of the percentage decline in GNP prices to the percentage decline in real GNP for 1930-31, 1931-32, 1932-33, and 1937-38, the other Great Depression years in which real GNP declined, were 1.0, 0.9, 1.2, and 0.3, respectively, all well below the 1920-21 figures."
According to the monetarist story, the sharp deflation of the Great Depression is the dis-equilibrating factor which the Fed did not fix by counteracting with aggressive money supply inflation. The Austrians, however, saw the sharp deflation as the equilibrating factor to the great inflation of the 1920s.
Whatever the take on whether the deflation was "good" or "bad," both schools seemed to agree that what really mattered was how prices reacted to the change in the money supply. Monetarists (and Keynesians) seemed to believe that prices were "sticky" downward, especially wage rates. Therefore, in a sharp deflation, a monetarist wouldn't trust the market to adjust nominal wages down fast enough to keep up with the deflation, so the policy response should be to "reflate" the money supply back up to the pre-deflation levels to avoid massive unemployment.
For example, using the figures for the 1921 deflation, real wages would be in the range of being 15%-22% higher after one year if the nominal wage rates didn't decline at all. The sudden increase in the real wage would not be a product of higher productivity, so therefore would not be sustainable, and for such a large amount in a short period of time, firms would have to lay off workers quickly to remain profitable.
Austrians also recognize this fact about deflations and wage rates, but instead argue that wage rates will fall to reflect the fall in the money supply. There will be unemployment for a time because a worker's wage is not like the price of wheat, meaning there is some stickiness downward, but not enough to be economically destructive. Furthermore, since Austrians believe that the inflation is the dis-equilibrating factor, reflation will just sow the seeds for the next bust in the economy, so it is better to swallow the bitter pill of temporary unemployment and move forward on a sustainable path after that rather than endure chronic boom-bust cycles caused by the inflation-deflation-reflation-inflation-etc. cycle.
Now that the severity of the 1921 deflation has been shown to be greater than the Great Depression deflation and that a severe deflation forces markets and policymakers to adjust quickly to reassert a sustainable economic path, let’s compare how the market and the government reacted to the 1921 depression and to the Great Depression. In any account that I have seen of the 1921 depression, even though the deflation was the sharpest ever seen, wage rates fell to accomadate the deflation and the depression was over before the government could even do anything. In fact, it is noted that under the Harding administration, the response was to lower taxes and government expenditures and to not hector businesses into keeping wages high, against the “wisdom” of then-Commerce secretary Herbert Hoover. Hoover laid the groundwork for such meddling by having many conferences and committees study how to get out of the depression (the President's Conference on Unemployment being the lead conference). Unfortunately for Hoover (and fortunately for the economy), all his hard work was for naught because the economy had fixed itself too quickly.
But as President, Hoover would be able enact the policies for the Great Depression that he dreamt up for the 1921 depression. Chapters 7-12 of Murray Rothbard’s “America’s Great Depression” detail his numerous interventions to keep nominal (and thus, real) wages high during a sharp deflation as well as prices in general for crops and other products. And the bite of government steadily increased during his term, as reflected on page 347 of the book:
1929 – 14.3% of gross private product, 15.7% of net private product
1930 – 16.4% of gross private product, 18.2% of net private product
1931 – 21.5% of gross private product, 24.3% of net private product
1932 – 24.8% of gross private product, 28.9% of net private product
Lots have said that the Hoover administration was a repudiation of the laissez-faire approach to dealing with an economic downturn, particularly one of the size of the Great Depression. By reading the chapters noted above and looking at the increasing burden of government during the Hoover administration, it is safe to say that laissez-faire wasn’t found wanting because it isn’t anywhere to be found at all. Hoover, “the Great Engineer,” had by his words in 1921 and his actions in his presidency was the antithesis of laissez-faire. In fact, Rexford Tugwell, leading advisor to Franklin Roosevelt, said "The ideas embodied in the New Deal legislation were a compilation of those which had come to maturity under Hoover's aegis... We all of us owed much to Hoover."
But, there are some who might look at the data and say that, yes, Hoover was a proto-New Dealer, but that he didn’t do enough. But by looking at the 1921 depression, we can see that the laissez-faire reaction did not lead to chronically high unemployment, unlike the Great Depression years of 1929-1940, when unemployment hit 24.9% in 1933 and the best unemployment numbers afterwards were at about 14% for 1937 and 1940. If “doing something” is better than “doing nothing,” then the “Hoover-didn’t-do-enough” crowd would have to explain why the “do-nothing” policy of Harding was a success (at least in the relative sense, but also in the absolute sense) and Hoover’s “did-something-but-not-enough” policy was a complete failure, rather than the reverse. I do not see how a completely unrestrained Keynesian prescription could have solved the 1921 depression in substantially less time than the laissez-faire policy.
If President Obama wishes to come out of this recession as quickly as the 1921 depression, he should adopt the policies of Harding and not those of Hoover-Roosevelt. But we know that he won’t because he, like 99.99% of Americans, has no knowledge of the 1921 depression, its wise remedy, and its good results. Unfortunately, he will choose the policies of persistent stagnation/depression that should have been discredited long ago by doing a simple comparison case study.
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This town, 59 feet above sea level, is the most underwater community in America.
Because of plunging home values, almost 90 percent of homeowners here
owe more on their mortgages than their houses are worth, according to figures
released Monday. That is the highest percentage in the country. The average
homeowner in Mountain House is "underwater," as it is known, by $122,000.
A visit to the area over the last couple of days shows how the
nationwide housing crisis is contributing to a broad slowdown of the American
economy, as families who feel burdened by high mortgages are pulling back on
their spending.
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The Federal Open Market Committee decided today to lower its target for the federal funds rate 50 basis points to 1 percent.
The pace of economic activity appears to have slowed markedly, owing importantly to a decline in consumer expenditures. Business equipment spending and industrial production have weakened in recent months, and slowing economic activity in many foreign economies is damping the prospects for U.S. exports. Moreover, the intensification of financial market turmoil is likely to exert additional restraint on spending, partly by further reducing the ability of households and businesses to obtain credit.
In light of the declines in the prices of energy and other commodities and the weaker prospects for economic activity, the Committee expects inflation to moderate in coming quarters to levels consistent with price stability.
Recent policy actions, including today’s rate reduction, coordinated interest rate cuts by central banks, extraordinary liquidity measures, and official steps to strengthen financial systems, should help over time to improve credit conditions and promote a return to moderate economic growth. Nevertheless, downside risks to growth remain. The Committee will monitor economic and financial developments carefully and will act as needed to promote sustainable economic growth and price stability.
Voting for the FOMC monetary policy action were: Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman; Timothy F. Geithner, Vice Chairman; Elizabeth A. Duke; Richard W. Fisher; Donald L. Kohn; Randall S. Kroszner; Sandra Pianalto; Charles I. Plosser; Gary H. Stern; and Kevin M. Warsh.
In a related action, the Board of Governors unanimously approved a 50-basis-point decrease in the discount rate to 1-1/4 percent. In taking this action, the Board approved the requests submitted by the Boards of Directors of the Federal Reserve Banks of Boston, New York, Cleveland, and San Francisco.
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"Liquidate labor, liquidate stocks, liquidate the farmers, liquidate real estate. . . . [That] will purge the rottenness out of the system. High costs of living and high living will come down. People will work harder, live a more moral life. Values will be adjusted, and enterprising people will pick up the wrecks from less competent people"However, using the above quote as evidence of laissez-faire is distortion of the truth. In fact, President Hoover was too much of an activist to sit on his hands and let the markets work. Until the crash of 1929, the general policy of the federal government to an economic crisis was a relatively hands-off approach. However, Hoover wanted to bail out the failing enterprises. Here is what he said during one of his campaign speeches in 1932 on this matter.
"we might have done nothing. That would have been utter ruin. Instead we met the situation with proposals to private business and to Congress of the most gigantic program of economic defense and counterattack ever evolved in the history of the Republic. We put it into action. . . . No government in Washington has hitherto considered that it held so broad a responsibility for leadership in such times. . . . For the first time in the history of depression, dividends, profits, and the cost of living, have been reduced before wages have suffered. . . . They were maintained until the cost of living had decreased and the profits had practically vanished. They are now the highest real wages in the world. Creating new jobs and giving to the whole system a new breath of life; nothing has ever been devised in our history which has done more for . . . “the common run of men and women.” Some of the reactionary economists urged that we should allow the liquidation to take its course until we had found bottom. . . . We determined that we would not follow the advice of the bitter end liquidationists and see the whole body of debtors of the United States brought to bankruptcy and the savings of our people brought to destruction."Again from Hoover's memoirs...
"We developed cooperation between the federal, state, and municipal governments to increase public works. We persuaded employers to “divide” time among their employees so that as many as possible would have some incomes. We organized the industries to undertake renovation, repair, and, where possible, expand construction."Rhetoric is one thing and reality is another. Reality was a Keynesian's delight. Huge deficit spending by the Hoover administration. The following is from America's Great Depression by Murray Rothbard(PDF format).
"I determined that it was my duty, even without precedent, to call upon the business of the country for coordinated and constructive action to resist the forces of disintegration. The business community, the bankers, labor, and the government have cooperated in wider spread measures of mitigation than have ever been attempted before. Our bankers and the reserve system have carried the country through the credit . . . storm without impairment. Our leading business concerns have sustained wages, have distributed employment, have expedited heavy construction. The Government has expanded public works, assisted in credit to agriculture, and has restricted immigration. These measures have maintained a higher degree of consumption than would otherwise have been the case. They have thus prevented a large measure of unemployment. . . . Our present experience in relief should form the basis of even more amplified plans in the future."
Federal expenditures rose from $4.2 billion in 1930 to $5.5 billion in 1931—excluding government enterprises, it rose from $3.1 billion to $4.4 billion, an enormous 42 percent increase. In short, in the midst of a great depression when people needed desperately to be relieved of governmental burdens, the dead weight of government rose from 16.4 percent to 21.5 percent of the gross private product (from 18.2 percent to 24.3 percent of the net private product). From a modest surplus in 1930, the Federal government thus ran up a huge $2.2 billion deficit in 1931.And so President Hoover, often considered to be a staunch exponent of laissez-faire, had amassed by far the largest peacetime deficit yet known to American history. In one year, the fiscal burden of the Federal government had increased from 5.1 percent to 7.8 percent, or from 5.7 percent to 8.8 percent of the net private product.Hoover's (not FDR) Glass-Steagal
One thing Hoover was not reticent about: launching a huge inflationist program. First, the administration cleared the path for the program by passing the Glass–Steagall Act in February, which (a) greatly broadened the assets eligible for rediscounts with the Fed, and (b) permitted the Federal Reserve to use government bonds as collateral for its notes, in addition to commercial paper.Does the following sound familiar?
During 1932, President Hoover greatly stepped up his one man war on the stock market, particularly on shortsellers, whom he naïvely and absurdly persisted in blaming for the fall in stock prices. Hoover forgot that bulls and bears always exist, and that for every bear bet there must be an offsetting bull, and also forgot that speculation smooths fluctuations and facilitates movement toward equilibrium. On February 16, Hoover called in the leaders of the New York Stock Exchange and threatened governmental coercion unless it took firm action against the “bears,” the shortsellers. The Exchange tried to comply, but not aggressively enough for Hoover, who declared himself unsatisfied.Federal Home Loan Bank, a Hoover creation
Having warned the Exchange of a Congressional investigation, Hoover induced the Senate to investigate the Stock Exchange, even though he admitted that the Federal Government had no constitutional jurisdiction over a purely New York institution. The President used continual pressure to launch the investigation of what he termed “sinister” “systematic bear raids,” “vicious pools . . . pounding down” security prices, “deliberately making a profit from the losses of other people.” Beside such demagogic rhetoric, constitutional limitations seemed pale indeed. Secretary of Commerce Lamont protested against the investigation, as did many New York bankers, but Hoover was not to be dissuaded. In answering the New York bankers, Hoover used some unknown crystal ball to assert that present prices of securities did not represent “true values.”
President Hoover, we remember, had wanted to establish a grandiose mortgage discount bank system to include all financial institutions, but the rejection of the scheme by insurance companies forced him to limit compulsory coverage to the building-andloan associations. The Federal Home Loan Bank Act was passed in July, 1932, establishing 12 district banks ruled by a Federal Home Loan Bank Board in a manner similar to the Federal Reserve System.It didn't end there...
$125 million capital was subscribed by the Treasury, and this was subsequently shifted to the RFC.
Measures such as Federal and state and local public works, worksharing, maintaining wage rates (“a large majority have maintained wages at high levels” as before), curtailment of immigration, and the National Credit Corporation, Hoover declared, have served these purposes and fostered recovery. Now, Hoover urged more drastic action, and he presented the following program:Did I mention Smoot-Hawley or Hoover Dam?
(1) Establish a Reconstruction Finance Corporation, which would use Treasury funds to lend to banks, industries, agricultural credit agencies, and local governments;
(2) Broaden the eligibility requirement for discounting at the Fed;
(3) Create a Home Loan Bank discount system to revive construction and employment measures which had beenwarmly endorsed by a National Housing Conference recently convened by Hoover for that purpose;
(4) Expand government aid to Federal Land Banks;
(5) Set up a Public Works Administration to coordinate and expand Federal public works;
(6) Legalize Hoover’s order restricting immigration;
(7) Do something to weaken “destructive competition” (i.e., competition) in natural resource use;
(8) Grant direct loans of $300 million to States for relief;
(9) Reform the bankruptcy laws (i.e., weaken protection for the creditor). Hoover also displayed anxiety to “protect railroads from unregulated competition,” and to bolster the bankrupt railroad lines. In addition, he called for sharing-the-work programs to save several millions from unemployment.
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Only the free market can judge risks. The failures are not of the free market,
the failures happened because we did not have a free market.
Instead we had
governments sponsorship of the GSEs, government sponsorship of the ratings
agencies, micro management of interest rates by the Fed, fractional reserve
lending compounded by Greenspan himself authorizing sweeps of checking
accounts.
Sweeps permitted nearly every penny of money that is supposed to be
available on demand to be lent out. Money that you think is in your checking
account is simply not there. It has been lent out.
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During the conference call held to discuss the quarter, Chairman and CEO Andrew Gould initial statements included:
Gould and the other executives were then questioned, some may say "interrogated", by analysts as to the extent and duration of any downturn.
( Click subject line for the entire article )
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Wall Street had it wrong: An investment bank's most precious asset isn't the army of employees who head down the elevators each day. It's the paychecks they take with them out the door.( Click the subject line to read the whole article. )
You can imagine the devilish grins on the faces of Morgan Stanley employees last week, after the Treasury Department said it would pump $10 billion into the bank. Not only did we, the taxpayers, save their company, with the help of a Japanese bank named Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group Inc. More importantly, we funded their 2008 bonus pool.
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Socialist Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez mocked George W. Bush as a
"comrade" on Wednesday, saying the U.S. president was a hard-line leftist for
his government's intervention of major private banks in the U.S. financial
crisis.
Chavez, who calls capitalism an evil and ex-Cuban leader Fidel Castro
his mentor, ridiculed Bush for his plan for the federal government to take
equity in American banks despite the U.S. right-wing's criticism of Venezuelan
nationalizations.
Hugo is right for a change
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Chesapeake Energy Corp. said its chief executive officer, Aubrey McClendon, involuntarily sold ``substantially all'' of his common shares of the company's stock over the past three days to meet margin loan calls.
``These involuntary and unexpected sales were precipitated by the extraordinary circumstances of the worldwide financial crisis,'' McClendon said in today's statement. ``In no way do these sales reflect my view of the company's financial position or my view of Chesapeake's future performance potential.''
McClendon, 49, owned 33.5 million shares, or 5.8 percent of the company's common stock, according to a Sept. 30 filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. He was the company's third-largest shareholder.
Chesapeake, this year's worst-performing petroleum producer in the Standard & Poor's 500, fell 6.7 percent in New York trading today amid concern hedging contracts won't protect the company against a plunge in natural-gas prices. McClendon's divestiture was announced after the close of regular trading on U.S. stock markets.
``You have to imagine Aubrey's lost a large portion of his fortune,'' Benjamin Dell, an analyst at Sanford C. Bernstein & Co., said today in a telephone interview. He rates the stock at ``market perform'' and owns none.
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“Can I ask a question?
With oil at $84 ....
Where is Oil Shock?
Mish
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In a move that could help increase home ownership rates among minorities and low-income consumers, the Fannie Mae Corporation is easing the credit requirements on loans that it will purchase from banks and other lenders.
The action, which will begin as a pilot program involving 24 banks in 15 markets -- including the New York metropolitan region -- will encourage those banks to extend home mortgages to individuals whose credit is generally not good enough to qualify for conventional loans. Fannie Mae officials say they hope to make it a nationwide program by next spring.
Fannie Mae, the nation's biggest underwriter of home mortgages, has been under increasing pressure from the Clinton Administration to expand mortgage loans among low and moderate income people and felt pressure from stock holders to maintain its phenomenal growth in profits.
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If capitalism depends on designating a person of godlike abilities to manage demand and supply for all forms of money and credit -- currency, demand deposits, money-market funds, repurchase agreements, equities, mortgages, corporate debt -- we are as doomed as those wretched citizens who relied on central planning for their economic salvation.
Think of it: Nothing is more vital to capitalism than capital, the financial seed corn dedicated to next year's crop. Yet we, believers in free markets, allow the price of capital, i.e., the interest rate on loanable funds, to be fixed by a central committee in accordance with government objectives. We might as well resurrect Gosplan, the old Soviet State Planning Committee, and ask them to draw up the next five-year plan.
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Chart: Monetary baseLabels: banking, central bank, credit bubble, dollar, economy, inflation/deflation
In his Communist Manifesto, published in 1848, Karl Marx proposed 10 measures to be implemented after the proletariat takes power, with the aim of centralizing all instruments of production in the hands of the state. Proposal Number Five was to bring about the “centralization of credit in the banks of the state, by means of a national bank with state capital and an exclusive monopoly.”
If he were to rise from the dead today, Marx might be delighted to discover that most economists and financial commentators, including many who claim to favour the free market, agree with him.
Indeed, analysts at the Heritage and Cato Institute, and commentators in The Wall Street Journal and on this very page, have made declarations in favour of the massive “injection of liquidities” engineered by central banks in recent months, the government takeover of giant financial institutions, as well as the still stalled US$700-billion bailout package. Some of the same voices were calling for similar
interventions following the burst of the dot-com bubble in 2001.“Whatever happened to the modern followers of my free-market opponents?” Marx would likely wonder.
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An email from Manhattan: "I just walked by the New York Stock Exchange. Hundreds of demonstrators have gathered to protest the government's bailout of Wall Street. Several were holding placards that read "Stop the bailout! Read The Road to Serfdom by FA Hayek. Read mises.org " They were also handing out copies of Ron Paul's 2003 speech introducing his bill to eliminate subsidies to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. ( from blog.mises.org/blog )
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"They called him the Gorilla - the brawler known as the scariest man on Wall Street," writes the Times of London about Richard Fuld, CEO of Lehman, and the story tells of his rise and fall. Here is a striking annotated painting posted outside Lehman offices for staff to post their comments on. Click here to view. (Thanks to mises.org)
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Big brokerage firms like Goldman Sachs, Lehman Brothers and Morgan Stanley are
facing increasing calls this week that they should be regulated the same way as
banks because they're so important to the health of the world's financial
system.
Timothy Geithner, president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York, said in a speech on Monday that all institutions that play a central role
in financial markets -- including the largest global brokerage firms -- should
operate under a unified regulatory framework.
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One of the greatest free market economists that ever lived, Ludwig von Mises, had this to say about credit expansion ( a.k.a Ponzi finance )
Of course, Milton Friedman would disagree. Friedman, and his socialist counterparts, believe that ponzi finance schemes can continue forever without ever causing a credit contraction (deflation) or even a crack up boom ( hyperinflation ). He even won a nobel prize for that theory. Central bankers have revered Friedman ever since, but, have we gotten rid of bubbles and their subsequent busts? Answer is a resounding No!The boom can last only as long as the credit expansion progresses at an ever-accelerated pace. The boom comes to an end as soon as additional quantities of fiduciary media are no longer thrown upon the loan market. But it could not last forever even if inflation and credit expansion were to go on endlessly. It would then encounter the barriers which prevent the boundless expansion of circulation credit. It would lead to the crack-up boom and the breakdown of the whole monetary system.
The credit expansion boom is built on the sands of banknotes and deposits. It must collapse. If the credit expansion is not stopped in time, the boom turns into the crack-up boom; the flight into real values begins, and the whole monetary system founders. Continuous inflation (credit expansion) must finally end in the crack-up boom and the complete breakdown of the currency system.
In 1967, Ayn Rand published her non-fiction book, Capitalism, the Unknown Ideal. In it, she included Gold and Economic Freedom, the essay by her close friend Alan Greenspan (Mr. Bubbles). In that essay, Greenspan argues persuasively in favor of a gold standard and against the concept of a central bank. Is it ironic that the Maestro became a central banker himself and precided over the biggest expansion of money supply ever witnessed in America? Printing Press Benny has taken over the reigns from Easy Al, and, we get more of the same. Will it work for Benny the way it did for Easy Al? I doubt it!
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