Rick Santelli: Rant of the Year

On CNBC

Cast Aways: A Thought Experiment

Here is a thought experiment:

Imagine an Island with population for 4 people: Frank Farmer, Charlie Chef, Mike Miner, Sam Smith.

Frank grows grains for all the other three, Charlie bakes and cooks for all the other three, Mike Mines Iron & coal, and Sam makes tools for all the other three. They sleep in caves and live their lives.

Frank saves some grains for that proverbial rainy day. Mike saves some coal and steel, just in case the mine collapses, or if he falls sick. Charlie pickles some vegetables and meat, just incase. Sam keeps few extra tools, just in case he becomes handicapped.

One fine day, Barry Bum washes up the shore of the Island. The islanders welcome Barry. They had an overdose of confidence. Out of the goodness of their heart, they feed Barry the first day. Barry promises that he will pay them back with interest. Next day, Barry eats another meal and gives them an IOU. All of a sudden, Charlie realizes that there is more demand for his cuisines, he starts to serv up his savings. He realize that he needs more utensils, which comes from Sam's savings. Sam suddenly realizes that he needs to replenish his savings, and demands more from Mike's savings. Charlie demands more grain from Frank and that starts to deplete Frank's savings. This goes on for some time as everybody keeps themselves busy. Barry in the mean time takes a vacation to a near by island for a couple of days and comes back ( Home equity extraction ). Once the savings gets depleted, people work harder and produce a little bit more than they used to, to feed the extra person Barry.

Then proverbial rainy day arrives; Charlie falls sick and decides to cash the IOUs he has recieved from Barry. However, Barry has nothing to pay his debts with and hence no way for Charlie to repay his own debts back to Frank or Sam. This causes Sam to realize that he has no way of paying Mike. A credit crunch takes shape. They also realized that there is no need to do the extra work to keep feeding the unproductive Barry. Suddenly Charlie stop producing for Barry, hence he demands less from Frank and Sam.

Ed Empircal Economist comes to the picture and says, there is a lack of confidence. Charlie needs to start feeding Barry as if nothing has happened. He says aggregate demand is going down. See all the idle tools now? Government needs to take over and put these "idle" resources to use.

The reality is, economy was consuming more than it was producing, thus depleting the savings. It was malinvested in unproductive activities. May be, just may be, all the tools and savings allocated to making baking utensils need to re-allocated to some productive activity. May be they need to make pull-carts to transport the produce and iron ore.

If you introduce money into this island's economy, nothing changes. When the farmer produces 100 island dollars worth of grains and produce, converts it to cash and save 10 island dollars, that savings exist as real goods in the economy. Same goes for Mike Miner, Charlie Chef, Sam Smith. When an entreprenuer borrows money to invest, he is actually creating claims against these savings of real resources and putting them to use.

Printing a bunch of money and throwing into the island is not going to make the savings re-appear overnight. The depleted savings have to be rebuilt.

Real life characters are unlikely to lend to Barry the bum to the point of their ruin. Which is the reason why Garry Government, takes away the risk by guaranteeing all the loans, implicitly or explicitly.

Matt Simmons on the Oil Market

Amity Shlaes: The Forgotten Man - Interview

I recenlty ordered "The Forgotten Man". Amity Shlaes, the author is an adjunct associate professor at NYU's Stern Business School.

Warren Buffet: Nobody Knows If Fiscal Stimulus will work

Susie Gharib: But there is debate about whether there should be fiscal stimulus, whether tax cuts work or not. There is all of this academic debate among economists. What do you think? Is that the right way to go with stimulus and tax cuts?

WB: The answer is nobody knows. The economists don’t know. All you know is you throw everything at it and whether it’s more effective if you’re fighting a fire to be concentrating the water flow on this part or that part. You’re going to use every weapon you have in fighting it. And people, they do not know exactly what the effects are. Economists like to talk about it, but in the end they’ve been very, very wrong and most of them in recent years on this. We don’t know the perfect answers on it. What we do know is to stand by and do nothing is a terrible mistake or to follow Hoover-like policies would be a mistake and we don’t know how effective in the short run we don’t know how effective this will be and how quickly things will right themselves. We do know over time the American machine works wonderfully and it will work wonderfully again.

( Via Calculated Risk: Click the subject line to read the whole thing )

Do You Have Performance Issues?

Stimulis may be right for you.

Ascent of Money - Book Review

I finished reading this book last week. Niall Ferguson as always makes a very engaging read. Book covers a lot of ground in terms of monetary and banking history. Book tries to explain the role money, banking and finance has played in the development civilization. However, in the end, leaves the author with the impression that it has been put together too quickly, to get it to market before the current turmoil in the financial markets get too far ahead.

Book covers everything from the early history of money to the modern finance, from banking and it's italian origins to the rise of the Rothschild dynasty, and from Incas to the Chinese. I would definitely recommend this to anyone who wants read about the history of money & banking..

Personal disagreements aside about how he interpreted the history, and his solutions for the future, book leaves a lot to be desired in terms of organization. The last chapter on the "Descent of Money" was short and unconvincing to say the least. Mr. Ferguson has worked hard to remain unbiased, but his monetarist bias comes through every now and then.

New Patent in EESU

The core ingredient is an aluminum coated barium titanate powder immersed in a polyethylene terephthalate plastic matrix. The EESU is composed of 31,353 of these components arranged in parallel. It is said to have a total capacitance of 30.693 F and can hold 52.220 kWh of energy. The device is said to have a weight of 281.56 pound including the box and all hardware. Unlike normal lithium-ion cells, the technology is said not to degrade with cycling and thus has a functionally unlimited lifetime.

( Click Subject Line to read the whole story - via ultracapacitors.org )

An Austrian Case Against Stimulus

I found the following comment on Austrian Economists Blog the most compelling case against economic stimulus I have seen so far.

There needs to be a in-depth comparison between the market and policy response of the 1921 depression and the Great Depression and what it means for the current crisis. Here it is:

Someone should really point to the 1921 depression for President Obama to study rather than the Great Depression of 1929-1933.

According to J.R. Vernon in "The 1920-21 Deflation: The Role of Aggregate Supply," the one-year deflation of this time is the largest ever recorded: “This is true whether the Department of Commerce [ 1986 ] estimates or the recently provided Balke and Gordon [ 1989 ] or Romer [ 1989 ] estimates are used. These estimates produce one-year deflation figures of 18 percent, 13.0 percent, and 14.8 percent, respectively. The closest competitor is the 11.5 percent deflation recorded for 1931-32, the third year of the Great Depression.” Furthermore, the "ratio of the percentage decline in the GNP deflator for 1920-21 to the percentage decline in real GNP is 2.6 using the Department of Commerce figures, 3.7 using the Balke and Gordon data, and 6.3 using the Romer data." But "the ratios of the percentage decline in GNP prices to the percentage decline in real GNP for 1930-31, 1931-32, 1932-33, and 1937-38, the other Great Depression years in which real GNP declined, were 1.0, 0.9, 1.2, and 0.3, respectively, all well below the 1920-21 figures."

According to the monetarist story, the sharp deflation of the Great Depression is the dis-equilibrating factor which the Fed did not fix by counteracting with aggressive money supply inflation. The Austrians, however, saw the sharp deflation as the equilibrating factor to the great inflation of the 1920s.

Whatever the take on whether the deflation was "good" or "bad," both schools seemed to agree that what really mattered was how prices reacted to the change in the money supply. Monetarists (and Keynesians) seemed to believe that prices were "sticky" downward, especially wage rates. Therefore, in a sharp deflation, a monetarist wouldn't trust the market to adjust nominal wages down fast enough to keep up with the deflation, so the policy response should be to "reflate" the money supply back up to the pre-deflation levels to avoid massive unemployment.

For example, using the figures for the 1921 deflation, real wages would be in the range of being 15%-22% higher after one year if the nominal wage rates didn't decline at all. The sudden increase in the real wage would not be a product of higher productivity, so therefore would not be sustainable, and for such a large amount in a short period of time, firms would have to lay off workers quickly to remain profitable.

Austrians also recognize this fact about deflations and wage rates, but instead argue that wage rates will fall to reflect the fall in the money supply. There will be unemployment for a time because a worker's wage is not like the price of wheat, meaning there is some stickiness downward, but not enough to be economically destructive. Furthermore, since Austrians believe that the inflation is the dis-equilibrating factor, reflation will just sow the seeds for the next bust in the economy, so it is better to swallow the bitter pill of temporary unemployment and move forward on a sustainable path after that rather than endure chronic boom-bust cycles caused by the inflation-deflation-reflation-inflation-etc. cycle.

Now that the severity of the 1921 deflation has been shown to be greater than the Great Depression deflation and that a severe deflation forces markets and policymakers to adjust quickly to reassert a sustainable economic path, let’s compare how the market and the government reacted to the 1921 depression and to the Great Depression. In any account that I have seen of the 1921 depression, even though the deflation was the sharpest ever seen, wage rates fell to accomadate the deflation and the depression was over before the government could even do anything. In fact, it is noted that under the Harding administration, the response was to lower taxes and government expenditures and to not hector businesses into keeping wages high, against the “wisdom” of then-Commerce secretary Herbert Hoover. Hoover laid the groundwork for such meddling by having many conferences and committees study how to get out of the depression (the President's Conference on Unemployment being the lead conference). Unfortunately for Hoover (and fortunately for the economy), all his hard work was for naught because the economy had fixed itself too quickly.

But as President, Hoover would be able enact the policies for the Great Depression that he dreamt up for the 1921 depression. Chapters 7-12 of Murray Rothbard’s “America’s Great Depression” detail his numerous interventions to keep nominal (and thus, real) wages high during a sharp deflation as well as prices in general for crops and other products. And the bite of government steadily increased during his term, as reflected on page 347 of the book:

1929 – 14.3% of gross private product, 15.7% of net private product
1930 – 16.4% of gross private product, 18.2% of net private product
1931 – 21.5% of gross private product, 24.3% of net private product
1932 – 24.8% of gross private product, 28.9% of net private product

Lots have said that the Hoover administration was a repudiation of the laissez-faire approach to dealing with an economic downturn, particularly one of the size of the Great Depression. By reading the chapters noted above and looking at the increasing burden of government during the Hoover administration, it is safe to say that laissez-faire wasn’t found wanting because it isn’t anywhere to be found at all. Hoover, “the Great Engineer,” had by his words in 1921 and his actions in his presidency was the antithesis of laissez-faire. In fact, Rexford Tugwell, leading advisor to Franklin Roosevelt, said "The ideas embodied in the New Deal legislation were a compilation of those which had come to maturity under Hoover's aegis... We all of us owed much to Hoover."

But, there are some who might look at the data and say that, yes, Hoover was a proto-New Dealer, but that he didn’t do enough. But by looking at the 1921 depression, we can see that the laissez-faire reaction did not lead to chronically high unemployment, unlike the Great Depression years of 1929-1940, when unemployment hit 24.9% in 1933 and the best unemployment numbers afterwards were at about 14% for 1937 and 1940. If “doing something” is better than “doing nothing,” then the “Hoover-didn’t-do-enough” crowd would have to explain why the “do-nothing” policy of Harding was a success (at least in the relative sense, but also in the absolute sense) and Hoover’s “did-something-but-not-enough” policy was a complete failure, rather than the reverse. I do not see how a completely unrestrained Keynesian prescription could have solved the 1921 depression in substantially less time than the laissez-faire policy.

If President Obama wishes to come out of this recession as quickly as the 1921 depression, he should adopt the policies of Harding and not those of Hoover-Roosevelt. But we know that he won’t because he, like 99.99% of Americans, has no knowledge of the 1921 depression, its wise remedy, and its good results. Unfortunately, he will choose the policies of persistent stagnation/depression that should have been discredited long ago by doing a simple comparison case study.

(by Logan Boettcher - a commenter at AustrianEconomists.typepad.com )